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COMMENTS
BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: CAN IMMIGRATION
HEARINGS BE CLOSED TO PROTECT THE
NATION'S INTEREST?
Meaghan E. Ferrell'
The First Amendment restricts Congress from making laws that
abridge freedom of speech and freedom of the press.' The Supreme
Court has held that free speech is not absolute; instead, it must be
balanced against valid governmental interests In the aftermath of the
May 2003 graduate of The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. Implicit in the
restriction on abridging freedom of speech or of the press is that the freedom already
existed. See id. That freedom may not previously have existed in the immigration system.
If that is true, there is no freedom to curtail and no First Amendment right to access
information and/or proceedings that are the product of the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Service's (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service's) functions.
2. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (stating that the First
Amendment does not prohibit a state from regulating professional organizations in the
interest of the public); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961)
(holding that a state bar applicant's failure to respond to questions regarding his
involvement in the Communist Party was not protected by the First Amendment); In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 89 (1961) (finding that the state's interest in regulating bar
admission outweighs petitioner's First or Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of
speech).
In Konigsberg, the Supreme Court debated over whether the First Amendment is an
absolute right or if, in certain circumstances, it is subject to a balancing test. See
Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50-51. Justice Black's dissenting opinion stated that the language
of the First Amendment that prohibits Congress from abridging the freedom of speech
indicates that "the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be
done in this field." Id. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black expressed a fear that the
Bill of Rights could be "balance[d] ... out of existence," when its purpose was to keep
those rights out of congressional grasp. Id. The majority of the Court, on the other hand,
relied on Court precedent in its holding:
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to
pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental
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September 11, 2001 attacks, the public seems to agree.3 In fact, a New
York Times poll conducted just before the first anniversary of the attacks
revealed that forty-nine percent of Americans felt that the First
Amendment's protections went too far in the context of the war on
terrorism.4  Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Americans
have been doing what Americans do best in times of national threat:
rallying behind their country and government.
5
The federal judiciary historically has deferred to the political branches
in foreign affairs and matters of national security.6 However, judicial
deference has been limited in recent cases stemming from the terrorist
interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a
weighing of the governmental interest involved.
Id. at 50. The Court cited Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States to support this
point. Id. at 50 n.1l (quoting 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919)) ("1 do not doubt for a moment that
by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United
States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear
and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent."). The Court compared this to Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Whitney v. California. Id. (quoting 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)) ("But,
although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their
nature absolute."). Finally, the Court quoted Chief Justice Hughes to support its opinion.
Id. (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)) ("[TJhe protection [of free
speech] even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.").
3. A Los Angeles Times poll, conducted from August 22-25, 2002, revealed that
forty-nine percent of those polled were willing to give up some of their civil liberties in
order to make the country safe from terrorism. L.A. TIMES Poll, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/terror3.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003); see also Nicholas D.
Kristof, Editorial, Security and Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A25.
4. See Kristof, supra, note 3. By the second anniversary of the September 11, 2001
attacks, the number of citizens who believed the First Amendment goes too far dropped to
thirty-four percent. First Amendment Center, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2003 2,
available at www.fac.org/PDF/SOFA.2003.pdf.
5. Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush's ratings
soared. See Jane Spencer, Newsweek Poll: Bush Soars, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2001, at
http://msnbc.com/news/629455.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). The Newsweek poll found
that eighty-nine percent of respondents approved of the way President Bush responded to
the crisis. Id. His overall approval rating rose to eighty-two percent, surpassing President
George H. W. Bush's rating during the Gulf War, and nearly equaling that of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt after the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Id. President Bush's
approval rating had been as low as fifty-two percent in July 2001, according to a USA
Today poll. See Richard Benedetto, Bush Approval Rating Down 10 Points Since April,
USA TODAY, Jul. 2, 200 t, available athttp://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/julyOl/
2001.-07-02-bush.htm.
6. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(stating that "[i]n this vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation"); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1400-01
(1999) (tracing the political question doctrine through history).
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attacks, in which courts have considered challenges to the authority of
the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)7 to regulate deportation hearings as part of the war on terror.'
Two such cases involve claims by press organizations that a directive
denying them access to deportation hearings violates their First
Amendment rights.9 The two cases, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft and
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, traveled from the district
courts, where the government lost, to the Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Sixth Circuits, which split on the issue.0° The Third Circuit
afforded great deference to the decisions of the executive branch,"
whereas the two district courts and the Sixth Circuit offered virtually
none. With two circuits split and a vital issue of national security in the
balance, the Supreme Court denied the North Jersey Media petitioners
7. The Immigration and Naturalization Service was renamed the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Service as of November 25, 2002. Establishment of Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113
(D.D.C. 2002) (requiring the government to release the identities of those individuals
detained during the post-September 11h investigations and their counsel, but allowing the
government to withhold the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release); Haddad
v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that Haddad's
classification as a "special interest" alien tainted his ability to receive a fair deportation
hearing); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(reversing a preliminary injunction that enjoined the government from closing deportation
hearings of "special interest" aliens); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937,
940 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (granting a motion to enjoin the
government from closing deportation hearings of "special interest" aliens).
9. See North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288; Detroit Free Press, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 937.
10. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681; North Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d
198. At the time of the Detroit Free Press appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the bench was half empty, having only eight of the sixteen positions filled. See Press
Release, United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, New Appellate Judges
Needed Now (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/releases/1999/
jd042502.htm.
11. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220 ("Our judgment is confined to
the extremely narrow class of deportation cases that are determined by the Attorney
General to present significant national security concerns. In recognition [of] his
experience (and our lack of experience) in this field, we will defer to his judgment.").
12. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 945 ("To determine the limitations of the
right of access and thus where the First Amendment will not prohibit a particular
governmental action, courts traditionally apply a strict scrutiny analysis."); North Jersey
Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 304 ("There is no basis for finding that the harm caused
to the government would outweigh the value achieved by enjoining a practice that violates
the Constitution."); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 685 ("We hold that the Constitution
meaningfully limits non-substantive immigration laws and does not require special
deference to the Government.").
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certiorari on May 27, 2003.13 This left immigration hearings of aliens with
suspected terrorist ties closed in all but the Sixth Circuit.
14
This Note examines the executive branch's authority to regulate the
conduct of immigration proceedings in the interest of national security.
This Note first reviews two relevant court cases from the Third and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals. It then outlines the historical holdings
regarding the legislative branch's plenary power in matters of
immigration. This Note then analyzes the level of deference the courts
have granted, and should continue to grant, to the executive branch when
reviewing actions taken by the executive in immigration matters
purporting to be in the national public interest. Finally, this Note
discusses the reasons why access to immigration hearings should not be
compared to access to criminal proceedings.
I. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 BY TIGHTENING IMMIGRATION POLICIES
A. The Horrific Events of September 11, 2001
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers
commandeered four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon in the most deadly terrorist attack on United
States soil. 5 Shortly following the attacks, authorities learned that at
least fifteen of the hijackers, all of Middle Eastern descent and members
of the militant group al Qaeda, had entered the United States legally on
various types of visas." In response to the attacks, Congress approved a
Joint Resolution on September 18, 2001 that authorized the President "to
take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against
the United States.'
17
13. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.; see also Travis Loop, Stepping Up Secrecy,
PRESSTIME, Sept. 2003, at 34.
15. See Evan Thomas & Mark Rosenball, Bush: "We're at War, "NEWSWEEK, Sept.
24, 2001, at 34. More people were killed by the suicide hijackers of September 11, 2001
than were killed at Pearl Harbor. Id. A fourth plane was hijacked and crashed into a field
in rural Pennsylvania. Id.
16. See Edward T. Pound, The Easy Path to the United States for Three of the 9/11
Hijackers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 12, 2001, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/terror/artices/visa011212.htm.
17. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
The purpose of the resolution was to "prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States." Id. § 2. In order to accomplish this goal, the Senate authorized
the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against all organizations,
countries, and persons who participated in any way in the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. Id. In addition, the resolution constituted "specific statutory authorization" as
defined in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Id.
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B. The INS Searched the Immigrant Population for Suspected Terrorists
1. Detention of Aliens for Violations ofImmigration Policy
As part of the administration's policy, the INS began "identify[ing],
question[ing], and institut[ing] removal proceedings""8 against aliens with
suspected terrorist ties, and authorized holding the aliens for extended
periods of time.1 9 A post-September 1 1
'h regulation established by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) permits the INS to hold arrestees for up to
forty-eight hours before determining how to proceed.0 The procedural
options include voluntary departure from the United States, arrest and
detainment, and release of the alien on bond or his/her own• 21
recognizance. The new regulation extended the preliminary holding
period by twenty-four hours, which enabled the INS to "establish an
alien's true identity; to check domestic, foreign, or international
databases and records systems for relevant information regarding the
alien; and to liaise with appropriate law enforcement agencies in the
United States and abroad. 2 2  The DOJ regulation also provided an
exception to the general forty-eight hour rule that allowed continued
detention should "an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance"
18. See Detroit Free Press v. Aschroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939-40 (E.D. Mich. 2002),
aff'd303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
19. See Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98
(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that as of May, 31, 2002, a total of 751 individuals had been
detained on immigration violations over the course of the hijacking investigation, of which
seventy-four were still detained as of June 13, 2002). The government's actions are
consistent with those exercised in previous times of war. See Kim Barker, Federal Tactics
Criticized in Roundup of 1,100; FBI Defends Detention Policy, but Some Courts Aren't
Convinced, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2002, at 16. For instance, after World War I, the
government questioned, detained, or deported thousands of legal immigrants in an
attempt to thwart the spread of communism. Id. During World War II, individuals of
Japanese ancestry in the United States were gathered and placed in internment camps. Id.
During the Cold War, the government jailed and blacklisted people for their alleged
communist views. Id.
20. Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)
(2002). The regulation was issued in the Federal Register on September 20, 2001, with an
effective date of September 17, 2001. See Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept.
20, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287). On May 28, 2002, another INS regulation
was published in the Federal Register. See Protective Orders in Immigration
Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 28, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 3). This regulation permitted immigration judges to issue protective orders and to seal
any records related to sensitive law enforcement material or national security information.
See id.
21. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
22. Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. at 48,334.
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arise. 2' As of June 13, 2002, seventy-four detainees out of those
originally held after September 11 h remained in INS custody.4
2. Classification of Aliens as "Special Interest" Cases Pursuant to the
"Creppy Memo "
On September 21, 2001, at the direction of Attorney General John
Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a
memorandum (Creppy Memo) 25 to all immigration judges and court
administrators requiring that certain "special interest cases ''26 be held in
closed proceedings and with strict confidentiality. 27 The memo stated
23. Id. It is claimed that the INS detained many of the aliens for immigration
regulation violations, some of which would not normally justify detainment. See Amnesty
International, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING POST SEPTEMBER
1 DETENTIONS IN THE USA 2 (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/usacrisis/9.t1.detentions2.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
24. See Ctr. forNat. Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
25. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2003). The Creppy Memo was distributed to all immigration judges and court
administrators, and stated the following:
As some of you already know, the Attorney General has implemented additional
security procedures for certain cases in the Immigration Court. Those
procedures require us to hold the hearings individually, to close the hearing to
the public, and to avoid discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any
information about the case to anyone outside the Immigration Court ....
Although this is obviously a time of heightened security and concern, I am
confident that each of us will remember our obligation to be fair and impartial in
our dealings with everyone who comes to our courts. Thank you for your
understanding and your cooperation.
Id. Rahib Haddad, an INS detainee, challenged the policy in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. See Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802 (E.D.
Mich. 2002). Haddad alleged that the Creppy Memo violated the Administrative
Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirements. See id. The court ruled that although
the Creppy Memo appeared to be a final agency rule, it fell within the "foreign policy
exception" of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1), and therefore was
exempt from the notice-and-comment requirement. Id. at 802 n.7.
26. "Special interest" aliens are identified by the DOJ based on evidence acquired
during post-September 11h investigations. Government's Application For a Stay Pending
Appeal, at 5, Ashcroft v. North Jersey Media Group, Inc., 536 U.S. 954 (2002). They
consist of individuals who have "connections with, or possess information pertaining to,
terrorist activities in the United States." North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d
198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dale L. Watson, FBI Executive Assistant Director for
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence). In addition, aliens with close ties to the
hijackers or who have known relations with al Qaeda or other terrorist groups will be
deemed "special interest" cases. Id.
27. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Specifically, procedures proscribed by Judge Creppy appeared as follows:
[Vol. 52:981
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that Attorney General Ashcroft had established additional security
procedures applicable when such cases came before the court.2 The
procedures included the requirement that only judges with security
clearances hear special interest cases, that INS employees not comment
on a special interest alien's appearance before the court, 29 and, most
significantly, that all proceedings be closed to visitors, family, and press.O
An affidavit by James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent
Crimes Section of the DOJ's Criminal Division, sought to explain the
purpose of the Creppy Memo in terms of protection of the aliens." The
affidavit asserted that in closing the deportation hearings, the
government sought to protect the special interest case detainees from the
intimidation or harm that public identification would bring, and from
1. Because some of these cases may ultimately involve classified evidence, the
cases are to be assigned only to judges who currently hold at least a secret
clearance.
2. You should make certain that INS (or whoever provides your courtroom
security) is informed of the hearing and the need to provide additional
courtroom security.
3. Each of these cases is to be heard separately from all other cases on the
docket. The courtroom must be closed for these cases-no visitors, no family,
and no press.
4. The Record of Proceeding is not to be released to anyone except an attorney
or representative who has an EOIR-28 on file for the case (assuming the file does
not contain classified information). Any other request for information on one of
these cases must be submitted in writing and processed as a FOIA request, i.e.,
forwarded to the Office of the General Counsel.
5. This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether such a
case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing. Any press requests must be
referred to the Public Affairs Office at (703)-305-0289.
6. The ANSIR record for the case is to be coded to ensure that information
about the case is not provided on the 1-800 number and the case is not listed on
the court calendars posted outside the courtrooms.
7. Specific instructions about ANSIR coding and marking the ROP are provided
below.
8. Finally, you should instruct all courtroom personnel, including both court
employees and contract interpreters, that they are not to discuss the case with
anyone.
Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 25.
28. See Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 25.
29. An example of the "deny or confirm" requirement is included in a research article
written by Amnesty International (Al). See Amnesty International, supra note 23, at 7.
Amnesty International reports that one immigration lawyer who repeatedly called an INS
1-800 number, which normally allowed the lawyer to enter his client's identification
number to receive information on the client's whereabouts, received a new message. Id.
For post-September 11" detainees, the message he received was "case not found." Id.
When the lawyer spoke to INS officials, they stated that his client was "not in the system"
even though the lawyer knew that his client was in detention. See id.
30. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 25.
31. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946-47.
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adverse treatment even if they were absolved from any connection to
terrorism." In addition, according to Reynolds, the government would
encourage the detainees to continue communicating with terrorist
organizations so the government might acquire information to aid in the
infiltration of these groups.33 The affidavit further stated that releasing
the names of the detainees could reveal the direction and progress of the
investigation and allow terrorist organizations to "interfere with the
pending proceedings by creating false or misleading evidence.
3 4
Despite the intentions of the government in issuing the directive, press
organizations in Michigan and New Jersey challenged the Creppy
Memo.35 In both lawsuits, the press organizations sought to enjoin the
secrecy order.36 Each asserted a First Amendment right to attend these
"special interest" immigration proceedings.37
C. The Press Challenge to the INS's New Closed Deportation Hearing
Policy
1. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
The first challenge to closed deportation hearings, Detroit Free Press
v. Ashcroft, was heard in April 2002 in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. 8 In Detroit Free Press, a conglomerate of
newspapers and Congressman John Conyers, Jr., challenged their
exclusion from the hearings of an immigrant identified as a special
interest case by the DOJ. 9 The immigrant in the proceeding, Rabih
Haddad, entered the United States with his family in 1998 on a six-month
tourist visa and improperly remained in the country after his visa
expired.4 0 The government arrested and detained Haddad on December
32. Id. ("[D]isclosing the names of 'special interest' detainees.., could lead to public
identification of individuals associated with them, other investigative sources, and
potential witnesses ... [and t]errorist organizations ... could subject them to intimidation
or harm ....").
33. Id. at 946 (stating that "'divulging the detainees' identities may deter them from
cooperating ... [and] terrorist organizations with whom they have connection may refuse
to deal further with them ... thereby eliminating valuable sources of information for the
Government and impairing its ability to infiltrate terrorist organizations").
34. Id. at 946-47.
35. See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 937-42; North Jersey Media Group, Inc.
v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
36. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 941; North Jersey Media Group, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 290.
37. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 941-42; North Jersey Media Group, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 290.
38. 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
39. Id. at 940-41.
40. See id. at 941.
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14, 2001; a bond hearing was held five days later.4' The government
suspected that Haddad was funneling funds from an Islamic charity,
42which he operated, to terrorist organizations. At Haddad's bond
hearing, the court instructed members of the public, including Haddad's
family, Congressman Conyers, and the press, that the hearing was closed
to the public.43  The court had not provided prior notice that the
proceedings would be closed." Haddad objected to the closure, but the
immigration judge informed him that the judge's supervisors had ordered
her to close the hearing, and that she was unable to reverse the
supervisors' decision.4 ' As a result of evidence provided at the hearing,
the immigration judge denied Haddad bail and ordered his detainment 46
In granting the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, and determining that
the newspapers had a right to access the deportation hearings, the district
court looked to the historical tradition concerning the accessibility of
41. Id.
42. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,684 (6th Cir. 2002).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 941; see also Declaration of Ashraf Nubani,
attorney for Rahib Haddad, available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/haddad-nubani.pdf
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (setting forth the steps leading up to the lawsuit at issue).
46. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 941. Additional hearings regarding
Haddad's status were conducted on January 2 and 10, 2002. Id. Both of these hearings,
which had adverse results for Haddad, were heard before the same immigration judge and
were also closed to the public. Declaration of Ashraf Nubani, supra note 45.
At the same time that the newspaper plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, Haddad also filed a
lawsuit against the DOJ, claiming violation of his due process rights. See Haddad v.
Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 801 (E.D. Mich. 2002). After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding in Detroit Free Press, the trial court found that Haddad's closed
proceedings and classification as a special interest case resulted in biased determinations
by the immigration judge. See id. at 803-04. Therefore, the court ordered that Haddad
either be released from detention or be granted a new detention hearing held before a
new judge and open to the press and public. Seeid. at 805.
Haddad's case was assigned to a new immigration judge, who began a bond
redetermination hearing on October 1, 2002. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-
70339, 02-70605, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2002). After an in camera
review of the government's documents, the judge made particularized findings and closed
a portion of the hearing in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 3.46(a), which permits closure "to
protect national security or law enforcement interests." Id. Because the newspaper
plaintiffs were not present at the in camera review, nor were they allowed to make an
objection to the closure of the redetermination hearing, they filed emergency motions to
require the immigration judge to "(1) allow the [n]ewspaper [p]laintiffs' counsel to be
heard; (2) make a particularized determination, on the record, that closure is necessary to
further a compelling interest; (3) release transcripts of the closed proceedings; and (4)
release a non-redacted copy of the Government's pre-hearing brief." Id The court
concluded that the immigration judge had properly closed the hearing, but that in the
future, the court must make particularized findings on the record as to the basis for
closure. See id.
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removal hearings and the substantive importance of openness in the
hearings.47 The court recognized Congress' plenary power to legislate
rules for immigration, but stated that those powers extended only to the
substantive decisions of immigration, not to the procedural decisions that
allow the system to function.48 In other words, Congress can decide who
may and may not enter the country, but it cannot interfere with
procedural due process rights. 49 The court held that the government's
interest in closing the hearings was not compelling and that the press
would suffer irreparable injury if denied access to the hearings.5"
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction in
favor of the plaintiffs.5' The court affirmed that the political branch's
plenary power over matters of immigration is confined to substantive
determinations and does not extend to judicial procedures that ultimately
affect constitutional rights." The court derived its analysis from a line of
Supreme Court cases holding that non-citizens residing in the United
States "are afforded 'the same constitutional protections of due process
that we accord citizens."'53  Because Haddad had lived in the United
47. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 943-44. The court noted the differences
Congress has announced in the accessibility of exclusion and deportation hearings. Id. at
943. While Congress has specifically mandated the closing of exclusion hearings, it has
remained silent on the opening or closing of deportation. See id. The court inferred from
Congress' inaction that the hearings are - and have always been - presumptively open. Id.
48. Id. at 946 ("[T]he plenary power doctrine applies to '[plolicies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here' but '[i]n the enforcement of these policies,
the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process."' (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)).
49. See id.
50. Id at 947 (."[E]ven minimal infringement upon First Amendment values
constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief."' (quoting Newson v.
Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989)).
51. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
52. See id. at 686-93 ("It would be ironic, indeed, to allow the Government's
assertion of plenary power to transform the First Amendment from the great instrument
of open democracy to a safe harbor from public scrutiny.").
53. Id at 688 (quoting Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970)); see
also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (stating that "once an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all people within our borders"); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (holding that "aliens who have once passed through
our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law"); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950) (acknowledging that "[tihe constitutional requirement of
procedural due process of law derives from the same source as Congress' power to
legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body"); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (stating that a congressional act, which
called for the punishment and hard labor of Chinese immigrants, was valid only if it
provided for a judicial trial to establish guilt). But see United States ex rel Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1950) (holding that courts do not have the authority to
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States for a number of years, albeit illegally, the court found that he was
entitled to constitutional protections.54
The court then turned its focus to the First Amendment claims and
determined that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated
when the plaintiffs were barred from the proceedings." The court relied
largely upon the applicability of the tests set forth by the Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgini 6 and Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California.57 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court
stated that the First Amendment provided access to criminal• 58
proceedings. In deciding on the openness of a judicial proceeding, the
Supreme Court stated that a court should consider whether the type of
proceeding is one that has been historically open to the public and if the
public would play a positive role in the administration of justice.59 The
Sixth Circuit answered these questions affirmatively and held that closing
the deportation hearings violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights.60
In considering whether the government could overcome the plaintiffs'
First Amendment right of access to the deportation hearing, the court
further applied the strict scrutiny analysis articulated in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.6' This test is applicable when
government actions, aimed at protecting sensitive information,
62
inadvertently impede on First Amendment guarantees. In determining
review determinations of exclusion by the Government); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
37 (1982) (holding that due process should have been afforded to a permanent non-citizen
when the INS attempted to exclude him at the border upon return from a trip abroad).
54. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687-84.
55. 1d. at 694-705.
56. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
57. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
58. Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 10-13; See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580;
see also discussion infra Part II.C.1.
59. See Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 7-8; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71;
discussion infra Part II.C.1.
60. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. In determining that there is a history of
openness, the appellate court relied on Congress' failure to close the deportation hearings
and on the creation of a presumption of open hearings by INS regulations. Id. at 701. The
court listed the reasons why public access plays a positive role in deportation hearings. Id.
at 703-05. First, public access ensures fairness by placing a check on the Executive branch.
Id. at 703-04. Second, it ensures that the government does not make any mistakes. Id. at
704. Third, it serves a "therapeutic" value to those who feel targeted by the investigations,
allowing them to see first hand that the government is not acting unfairly. Id. Fourth, the
perception of integrity and fairness is enhanced. Id. Fifth, it allows active public
participation in the government. Id. at 704-05.
61. Id. at 705 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982)).
62. See id.; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. The issue before the
Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper was the validity of a Massachusetts statute that
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whether access to a hearing should be denied, the Globe Newspaper test
requires that the government provide evidence of a compelling interest
in protecting particularized findings that sufficiently justifies overriding
61the presumption of openness in Richmond Newspapers. In order for
the government to succeed under Globe Newspaper, the compelling
interest must be narrowly tailored so as not to act as a "mandatory
closure rule." 6  The Sixth Circuit panel decided that although the
government presented a compelling public interest, it did not survive the
Globe Newspaper test.65 Specifically, the Creppy Memo did not restrict
the alien's speech with regard to the events that took place during the
proceedings, nor did it require an individual assessment of whether a
required trial judges to close hearings during the testimony of rape victims who were
under the age of eighteen. Id. at 598. The petitioner, Globe Newspaper, was denied
access to a criminal trial in which a man was being tried for forcible rape and forced
unnatural rape of three minor girls. Id Globe Newspaper claimed that the statute
violated its First Amendment freedom of the press. See id.
In applying the RichmondNewspapertest, the Supreme Court considered whether "the
denial is necessitated by a compelling, governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Id. at 606-07. The Court agreed that the interest of the government
was compelling, but determined that it did not rise to the level necessary to justify
mandatory closure. Id. at 607-08. Instead, the trial court should determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the victim in the case before the court would best be served by a closed
proceeding. Id. at 608. Because the statute's narrow tailoring was insufficient, the
Supreme Court found it a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 609, 610-11.
63. Id. at 606-07; see Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705. "Under the standard
articulated in Globe Newspaper, government action that curtails a First Amendment right
of access 'in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information' must be supported by
a showing 'that denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
64. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-09.
65. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705 ("The Government's ongoing anti-terrorism
investigation certainly implicates a compelling interest. However, the Creppy directive is
neither narrowly tailored, nor does it require particularized findings. Therefore, it
impermissibly infringes on the [n]ewspaper [p]laintiffs' First Amendment right of
access.").
66. See Government's Application For a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 26, at 6-7.
There is nothing in the Creppy Memo that prevents the "special interest" alien from
attending hearings, receiving copies of unclassified information, or from presenting
witness testimony. The government contends that disclosure by a special interest alien of
the contents of a hearing is less damaging than "direct access by the public ... to the
hearing itself." Id. at 30. The alien may not wish to fully describe the discussions in the
hearing for self-interested reasons, he may not remember all that occurred in the hearing,
or "the importance of any particular detail may not be apparent to the alien or even to the
government." 1d, at 30-31.
In a footnote, the government analogizes the special interest alien to a witness in grand
jury proceedings. Id. at 31 n.12. In both instances, the proceedings are closed to "avoid
disclosing the investigation's progress to its potential targets and to spare suspects undue
embarrassment." Id. However, each can reveal his own testimony after the fact. Id.
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proceeding should be closed." The court held that the government's
interest was insufficient to justify closing the deportation hearings
because the Creppy Memo was not narrowly tailored, as required by
strict scrutiny analysis.6 s Accordingly, the policy infringed plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights and the injunction was granted.
2. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft
In the District Court of New Jersey, a similar challenge was brought in
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft. 9 In North Jersey Media
Group, the plaintiffs claimed that the DOJ violated their First
Amendment right to attend all deportation hearings, as opposed to the
plaintiffs in Detroit Free Press, who only sought relief for Haddad's
proceedings. As a result, an injunction granted in North Jersey Media
Group would be of "nationwide scope, appl[ying] to all proceedings
regardless of whether plaintiffs seek to attend."'" The plaintiffs in North
Jersey Media Group claimed a violation of their First Amendment rights
because of their preclusion from attending numerous deportation
hearings due to individual determinations that the aliens in the
proceedings were of "special interest.""
67. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707-10.
68. Id. at 710 ("The Creppy directive is underinclusive by permitting the disclosure of
sensitive information while at the same time drastically restricting First Amendment
rights. The directive is over-inclusive by categorically and completely closing all special
interest hearings without demonstrating beyond speculation, that such a closure is
absolutely necessary.").
69. 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002). The ACLU is a party to both Detroit Free
Press and North Jersey Media Group. See Press Release, Americans Civil Liberties
Union, A Second Federal Court Rejects Government Secrecy, Orders Open Immigration
Hearings in Post-Sept. 11 Challenge (May 29, 2002), available at
http://archive.aclu.org/news/2002/
n052902c.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
70. See North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2002);
see also Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683-84.
71. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204.
72. See 205 F. Supp. 2d at 291. The plaintiffs gave three examples of reporters who
were present at deportation hearings, and were asked to leave once the judge determined
that the matter was a special interest case. Id. The first occurred on November 22, 2001
when a reporter was not allowed to attend a hearing on the basis of the Creppy Memo. Id
On February 12, 2002, another reporter was denied docket information with respect to an
alien deemed a "special interest" case. Id. The same reporter also was denied access to
the deportation hearing held the following day. Id. The reporters claim that at a
deportation hearing on February 21, 2002, the immigration judge asked the INS attorney if
the hearing involved a special interest matter, to which the INS attorney responded
affirmatively. Id. The immigration judge then ordered all members of the press and
public to leave the courtroom. Id.
One alien, whose deportation hearing was classified a "special interest" matter, filed a
complaint in the District Court of New Jersey, claiming that the government violated his
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The court used an analysis similar to that of the trial and appellate
courts in Detroit Free Press.73 It determined that Congress' plenary
power over the immigration system is limited to substantive issues only;
because the Creppy Memo involves procedural matters, its validity and
application are subject to constitutional limitations.7 ' The court then
proceeded with a Richmond Newspapers analysis and determined, as did
the courts in Detroit Free Press, that the history and value of open
deportation hearings required the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs."
76*The court granted the injunction.
The government appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and
77requested a stay of the district court's decision. When the stay was
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, as well as provisions in an INS regulation
and the Administrative Procedure Act. North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 291
n.1 (referring to Zeidan v. Ashcroft, No. 02-843 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 28, 2002)). The
government removed the "special interest" label from the alien's record and moved to
dismiss the case as moot. Id. Subsequently, the case was dismissed without prejudice. Id.
73. See generally North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288.
74. Id. at 296-97. The court stated that the Supreme Court has historically
differentiated between substantive powers and procedural powers, finding that substantive
powers are "subject to important constitutional limitations." Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)); see also INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (holding that
Congress' plenary power is limited by the Constitution).
75. North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 300. The court held that due
process rights have attached to deportation hearings since 1903 and, because open
hearings are a safeguard of due process, deportation hearings have a substantial history of
openness. Id. Further, the court stated that because deportation hearings possess many of
the same characteristics of a criminal trial, the justifications for having open criminal
proceedings apply equally to deportation hearings. See id. at 301. The similarities
between the two proceedings include the fact that the alien appears before a judge, has
charges filed against him, has the option of representation by counsel, has the opportunity
to examine evidence against him, and has the opportunity to present evidence on his own
behalf. Id.
76. Id. at 305. The test for granting a preliminary injunction is: (1) whether the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; (2) whether granting the injunction will result in
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (3) whether granting the injunction is in the
public interest. Id. at 304-05. The court held that the first prong had been met because
failure to enjoin the judicial powers granted by the Creppy Memo would result in
irreparable harms to the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to access. Id. at 304. The
second prong was met because if the injunction is granted, the government's position
would not change. It could close the proceedings on a case-by-case basis pursuant to their
own regulations. Id. Finally, the court stated that "[clurtailing constitutionally protected
speech will not advance the public interest, and 'neither the Government nor the public
generally can claim an interest in the enforcement of an unconstitutional law."' Id. at 305
(citing ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2000)). The court concluded that the
balance tipped in the plaintiffs' favor in determining that the public's right to access was
more important than the government's interest in concealing names in the interest of
national security. See id. at 305.
77, See North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2002) ("On
June 17, 2002, this Court granted expedited review of the [g]overnment's appeal but
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refused, the government petitioned the Supreme Court to stay the
decision pending appeal.78 The Supreme Court granted the stay on June
28, 2002, but provided no guidance as to how it would decide the issue on
certiorari.7 9
The government prevailed when the Third Circuit, in a two-to-one
panel decision, held that the plaintiffs did not have a First Amendment
right to access the hearings... The Third Circuit agreed with the courts
that had previously addressed the issue and declared that the Richmond
Newspapers analysis was properly invoked." Under that analysis,
however, it determined that the history of openness was not sufficient to
82overcome the government's interest in closing the hearings.
denied a stay."); see also Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Supreme Court
Grants Stay, Allows Closed Immigration Proceedings (July 1, 2002) available at
http://www.rcfp.org/news/2002/0701northj.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
78. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204.
79. See Ashcroft v. North Jersey Media Group, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2655 (2002).
80. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 ("[W]e find that the application
of the Richmond Newspapers experience and logic tests does not compel us to declare the
Creppy Directive unconstitutional. We will therefore reverse the Order of the District
Court."); see also Jim Edwards, Challenge To Secret Deport Hearings Appears Headed
for US. High Court, 169 N.J.L.J. 1188 (2002). Judge Greenberg, a Third Circuit Judge
sitting on the panel presiding over North Jersey Media Group, recognized the severe
implications of the panel's role: "We could make a decision here upholding this [trial
ruling favoring openness] and lots of people may die .... You want us to run that risk? ...
How can we do that? They say there's a whole mosaic." Id.
81. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 208. The court examined its prior
decisions applying the Richmond Newspapers test to administrative hearings. Id. at 207-
09; see also Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir.
1999) (denying a claim that citizens have a First Amendment right to videotape a
Township Planning Commission meeting); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d
1164, 1177 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that Richmond Newspapers did not demand that state
environmental agency records be open to the public); First Amendment Coalition v.
Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 473-79 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the
records from a judicial discipline hearing were not subject to public access because
proceedings of that kind do not have a history of openness).
82. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209-20. In its conclusion, the court
stated that its analysis should not be construed to deny access to any administrative
hearings or to all immigration hearings. See id. at 220. Instead, its analysis is to be applied
only to "the extremely narrow class of deportation cases that are determined by the
Attorney General to present significant national security concerns." Id. The Third
Circuit's determination that the "special interest" cases are narrowly defined directly
contravenes the trial court and the Detroit Free Press courts, all of which stated that the
defined class was not narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The Government's ongoing anti-terrorism investigation certainly
implicates a compelling interest. However, the Creppy directive is neither narrowly
tailored, nor does it require particularized findings. Therefore, it impermissibly infringes
on the [n]ewspaper [p]laintiffs' First Amendment right of access."); North Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301-02 (D.N.J. 2002) ("The problem with the
Creppy Memo is that there is nothing in it to prevent disclosure of this very information by
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In vacating the injunction, the Third Circuit caused a split in the
Circuits as to the validity of the press's First Amendment right to access
versus the secrecy sought by the government in "special interest"
immigration proceedings." The inconsistency among the Circuits
remains, however, because the Supreme Court denied the petitioners'
writ of certiorari on May 27, 2003.4
II. PRECEDENT REQUIRES THAT JUDICIAL DEFERENCE ON ISSUES OF
NATIONAL SECURITY BE APPLIED
A. The Legislative Branch Has Plenary Power Over Matters of
Immigration, to Which the Judiciary Should Defer
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress's authority to make
laws regarding immigration is so closely tied to both the conduct of
foreign policy and the maintenance of national sovereignty, that the
Court must recognize the plenary authority of the political branches."
The source of Congress's power to legislate in immigration matters is
incident to the maintenance of national sovereignty." Every government
has an inherent responsibility to protect the national public interest.
the 'special interest' detainee or that individual's lawyer, both of whom are permitted to
be present in the 'special interest' proceedings.").
83. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683. On November 21, 2002, the newspaper-
plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, at 17, North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-2524). The petitioners stated that the
rehearing was warranted because the decision directly conflicted with the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Detroit Free Press, was "irreconcilable" with Supreme Court and
Third Circuit decisions, and involved an area of great importance. Id. at 1.
84. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 2215 (2003).
85. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (stating that in matters of
immigration, "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete"). In Fiallo, the petitioners challenged a provision in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which disallowed alien special immigration status for a father's
illegitimate child. See id. at 791. However, a mother and child receive special treatment in
the same circumstances. See id. The father-petitioners claimed that the statute
discriminated against them based on their sex and marital status at the time the child was
born. Id. The Court recognized that while congressional determinations with respect to
aliens within our borders are subject to judicial review, that review is limited due to the
extraordinary powers of the political branch in the area of immigration. Id. at 794-95. The
dissent focused not on those individuals who would not be admitted based on their parent-
child status, but on citizens of the United States who would be segregated into a class of
persons that were not afforded full constitutional rights. Id. at 807 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
86. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (stating that if the
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Congress has implemented its authority in this area through a series of
both broad and specific delegations of authority to the Attorney General
concerning "the administration and enforcement... [of] laws relating to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens. ' ,88  In executing this
authority, the Attorney General must establish regulations necessary to
the conduct of his duties, such as developing standards and rules on
issues that are rationally related to the statute upon which he is relying.89
Though the immigration laws have been amended many times, the
Attorney General's authority has not been significantly altered; he or she
remains the principal actor enforcing the immigration laws of the United
States. °
88. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2002). The Attorney
General is granted all duties that do not conflict with those granted to the President, the
Secretary of State and its officers, or diplomats, or consular officers. Id. However, the
Attorney General's determination of all questions of law control as to the remaining
offices. Id.
89. Id. § 1103(a)(3); see Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728, 730-32 (1970) (holding
that the congressional grant of discretion to the Attorney General in matters of
immigration allows the Attorney General to consider the circumstances of the time and to
issue regulations regarding identifiable groups based on his findings); see also Matter of
Koden, 15 I. & N. Dec. 739, 746-47 (1976) (stating that the Attorney General may fashion
procedures within his discretion, including disciplinary proceedings); Narenji v. Civiletti,
617 F.2d 745,747 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
In Narenji) the plaintiffs challenged a regulation issued by the Attorney General that
required all nonimmigrant aliens of Iranian descent who were in the United States on
student visas to report to INS offices to provide information as to their living
arrangements and status in school. Narenji, 617 F.2d at 746. Failure to comply with the
regulation would subject the students to deportation proceedings. Id. at 747. The District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulation was within the Attorney
General's discretion. Id. First, the court looked to the authority conferred upon the
Attorney General by Congress to establish such regulations. Id. Next, it looked to the
foreign policy of the executive branch's objectives. Id Because the regulation was
promulgated in response to the Iranian government's seizure of the United States
Embassy in Tehran, and in an effort to encourage release of the hostages taken therein,
the court deferred to the President's foreign policy authority. Id. at 747-48.
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2002); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 503, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-649, § 503, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); Immigration and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, § 115, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
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B. Judicial Deference Should Be Heightened in the Name of Public
Interest
1. An Early Recognition of Congressional and Executive Authority to
Regulate in the Public Interest
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
legislate immigration laws in the interest of American citizens." The
Japanese Immigrant Case is an historical example of the executive
branch regulating immigration in the name of public interest. 92 In that
case, the Court determined whether an existing act of Congress, which
prohibited "paupers or persons likely to become a public charge" from
entering the country, conflicted with a treaty between the United States
and Japan. 3 The treaty provided the citizens of each country the "full
liberty to enter, travel or reside" in the other contracting country. 4 The
treaty included a provision that it would not affect any laws regarding
"police and public security."' 5  The Court found that the government
interest in preventing paupers and the like from immigrating to the
United States was a matter of police and public security, and thus, the
government had the authority to deny entry to the Japanese
91. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization "). Congress can delegate this power to executive officials,
but it is still not in the hands of the judiciary. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S.
86, 98 (1903) (citing In re Oteiza, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457
(1888); Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 458 (1840); Martin v. Mott,
12 Wheat. 19, 31 (1827).
A cornerstone case of judicial deference is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937), in which the Supreme Court recognized Congress' plenary power to
regulate in the interest of interstate commerce. See John J. Coughlin, The History of the
Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of Regulatory Governance, 38
IDAHO L. REV., 109-10 (2001); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132,
135 (1944) (deferring to the NLRB's determination that the newsboys were employees
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act).
92. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903) (stating that it is not
within the judiciary's province to review immigration matters in opposition to the
determinations of the legislative and executive branches).
93. Id. at 94, 96-97. The Deficiency Appropriation Act of October 19, 1888, as
amended March 3, 1891, stated that the excludable classes were "[aIll idiots, insane
persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a
loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists"
and anyone who received money or a ticket to come to the United States from a person
that fell within one of those classes. Id. at 94-95.
94. See id. at 96.
95. See id. at 97.
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immigrants." The Court firmly upheld its earlier opinions and found that
Congress's power to determine who may enter the United States, and on
what terms they could stay, was absolute.97  It stated that the fact that
these powers are to be entrusted to the executive branch to enforce
"without judicial intervention, [is a] principle[] firmly established" by
precedent.98 On the one hand, the Court recognized congressional and
executive authority to limit the judiciary's role in the area of
immigration; while on the other, the Court held tightly to its authority to
review due process violations of aliens who had assimilated into
American society.9
2. The Judiciary's Deference to the Political Branches in Cases of
Communist Sympathizers
While the Supreme Court in The Japanese Immigration Case
specifically drew a line between Congress's and the executive's plenary
power in exclusion cases, and those that are subject to judicial review in
"deportation" cases,' °° the Court has been more deferential in times
when deportable aliens are considered a potential threat to national
security. 10' During the rise of Communism in the early to mid-twentieth
96. Id. ("LF]or [the treaty] expressly excepts from its operation any ordinance or
regulation relating to 'police and public security.' A statute excluding paupers or persons
likely to become a public charge is manifestly one of police and public security.").
97. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 97-98 (noting that Congress may
"exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States; prescribe the terms and
conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may come to this country; establish
regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as come here in violation of law; and
commit the enforcement of such provisions, conditions and regulations exclusively to
executive officers, without judicial intervention").
98. Id. at 97.
99. See id. at 100-01 ("[I]t is not competent for ... any executive officer, at any time
... arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become subject in
all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally
here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard
upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.").
100. Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, (IIRIRA) aliens were either "excluded" or "deported." See Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Glossary & Acronyms, available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/
glosary.htm (last modified Jul. 18, 2002). The two categories have now been collapsed into
one term: removed. Id. However, because case law makes a distinction between exclusion
and removal, it is important to know the difference. An alien is excluded when he
presents himself at the border and the government makes a decision prior to entry not to
allow the alien into the country. See id. An alien is "deported" after gaining entry to the
United States if it is found he has violated any immigration laws. Id.
101. See Galvan v. Press, 327 U.S. 522, 523, 532 (1954) (holding constitutional a
congressional statute providing for the deportation of aliens involved in the Communist
Party); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581, 596 (1952) (Id.); see also Narenji v.
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that a regulation that required
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century, the Court deferred to Congress's enactment of several laws to
exclude or remove those associated with the Communist Party, and to
the executive branch's deportation of the "associating" aliens. Several
of these cases involved legal permanent resident aliens who had lived in
the United States for many years.104
One challenge involved the Alien Registration Act.' 5 In Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, the three resident alien petitioners had resided in the
United States since they were teenagers. 6 Each was summoned to
deportation hearings when the INS discovered his involvement with the
Communist Party.07 The Court rejected the petitioners' assertions that
Iranian nonimmigrant students to check in with INS officials was within the foreign policy
powers of the President).
102. See, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 590 ("We, in our private opinions, need not
concur in Congress' policies to hold its enactments constitutional. Judicially we must
tolerate what personally we may regard as a legislative mistake.").
103. Id at 588-89. The Court stated that:
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches
of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
Id. See discussion supra note 89.
104. See, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581-82. But see Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs
and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 840, 842 (1989) (citing the many civil liberty
victories beginning in the 1950's communist-era, including the right to international travel,
the invalidation of government restrictions on Communist propaganda, and the
invalidation of restrictions on employment of Communists in defense facilities).
105. See Alien Registration Act § 30, 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1940) (repealed 1952). The
Alien Registration Act made deportation mandatory for all resident aliens who were
members of organizations that advocated the "overthrow of Government by force and
violence." Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589 n.15. This applied to all qualifying aliens, even if
the alien had severed ties with the organization prior to the enactment of the Act. Id The
Act was signed after Congress received evidence that Soviet Union Communists were
using aliens to infiltrate the United States in an attempt to subvert preparations for the
United States' involvement in World War II. Id, at 590. The Supreme Court in
Harisiades, in comparing the political environment in 1952 to that in 1940 when the Act
was signed, stated that "[certainly no responsible American would say that there were
then or are now no possible grounds on which Congress might believe that Communists in
our midst are inimical to our security." Id,
106. 342 U.S. at 581-83. Petitioner Harisiades came to the United States from Greece
when he was thirteen years of age and had been a permanent resident for thirty-six years
at the time of the decision. Id. at 581-82. Petitioner Mascitti, a citizen of Italy, entered
the United States at the age of sixteen and remained a permanent resident for the next
thirty-two years. See id at 582. Petitioner Coleman was a native of Russia and entered
the United States at the age of thirteen, thirty-eight years prior to this decision. See id at
583.
107. Id. at 581-83. Each petitioner had a different level of involvement. See id.
Harisiades joined the Workers Party, knowing and agreeing with the principles and
philosophy of the Communist Party. See id. at 581-82. Mascitti, also a member of the
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they should be treated as citizens because they had been admitted as
permanent residents. '°8 Instead, the Court focused on national security
issues.' °9
The Supreme Court stated that when national security is at stake, it is
the province of the government to act in the interest of national
sovereignty." The majority explained that these petitioners were not
entitled to the same constitutional protections as citizens because, even
though they had the privilege of being permanent residents of the United
States, they had done so without denouncing their foreign citizenship.11'
This dual status allowed them to claim protections under both domestic
and international law, whichever best suited them, and to evade
American responsibilities, such as pledging allegiance to the United
States."2 The Court found that such issues are especially significant in
times of war, when a resident alien's country becomes an enemy of the
United States."3 During such times, the alien's "allegiance prevails over
his personal preference and also makes him our enemy, liable to
expulsion or internment.'' 1 4 The Court stated that only Congress could
determine when to "terminate [the Nation's] hospitality" because it is in
the best position to determine what is appropriate in regard to foreign
relations."5
Two years after the Harisiades decision, the Supreme Court addressed
a challenge to the Internal Security Act of 1950, an Act that required the
Attorney General to deport aliens who were members of the Communist
Party. 16 In Galvan v. Press, a resident alien petitioner 17 challenged the
Workers Party, knew it advocated violence, but claimed never to be clear on its policies.
Id. at 582. He resigned his membership in 1929. See id. Ms. Coleman was a member of
the Communist Party for a year and claimed she joined solely because of a particular
injustice it was fighting at the time. Id. at 583.
108. Id. at 584-91.
109. Id. at 588-91.
110. Id. at 587-88. ("But [the ability to expel aliens] is a weapon of defense and
reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. Such
is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave the law on the subject as
we find it.").
111. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 585-87.
112. See id. ("[T]o protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his right but
is a matter of permission and tolerance.").
113. Id. at 587.
114. Id.
115. See id. Justices Douglas and Black in dissent turned their heads on the majority's
reliance on Congress to regulate immigration laws. See id. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The scathing and curt dissenting opinion claimed that the right to life and liberty was an
express right conferred by the Fifth Amendment, whereas the power of Congress to
regulate deportation was implied. See id. at 599. Therefore, due process should prevail,
no matter what the congressional reasoning. See id. at 600-01.
116. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 526 (1954).
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constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that it violated his Due
Process rights."' The Court declared the statute constitutional and found
that the petitioner must be deported, but did so with an air of
hesitation. " 9 The Court stated that if it was "writing on a clean slate," it
might extend Due Process considerations to the regulation of aliens in
times of war.' 20  However, citing Supreme Court precedent"' andi. 122
Congress's long-held responsibility of setting immigration policy, theCourt declined such an approach.'23
3. In the Past, the Supreme Court Has Placed Limits on an Alien's
Defenses to Deportation in the Name of National Security
In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee1
24
(AAADC), the Supreme Court relied upon the need to protect foreign
intelligence in holding that aliens could not claim selective enforcement
as a defense to deportation.' This case involved a group of immigrants
117. See id. at 523. Petitioner was a Mexican alien who had lived in the United States
for thirty-six years. Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting). He had an American wife and four
American-born children. Id. In 1948, the petitioner was questioned by the INS, at which
time he admitted to a two-year membership in the Communist Party, from 1944 to 1946,
ending two years prior to the questioning. Id. at 523.
118. See id. at 525. Specifically, the petitioner asserted that there was insufficient
evidence that he was a knowing member of the Communist Party, and therefore, he was
not deportable. Id. at 525. The Court reviewed the legislative history and determined that
there did not have to be any knowledge that the group had an interest in overthrowing the
United States government. Id. at 526. The mere fact of membership was sufficient to
place petitioner in a deportable class. See id. But c. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156-
57 (1945) (holding that affiliation with a workers' union that subsequently became tied
with Communism was not sufficient to justify deportation).
119. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-31.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 531-32 ("We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to
human rights than our predecessors . . . and must therefore under our constitutional
system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens, on the basis of which we are
unable to find the Act of 1950 unconstitutional.").
122. Id. at 531 ("But that the formulation of these policies [pertaining to the entry of
aliens] is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the
legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.").
Again, the same dissenters in Harisiades voiced their disagreement, primarily based on the
fact that the petitioner's involvement was minimal at a time when the Communist Party
was a recognized political party. rd. at 532 (Black, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 526. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas implied that a balancing test could be
used, providing that those who are law-abiding, peaceful citizens should be granted due
process of law, thereby suggesting that not all aliens deserved such a privilege. See id at
534 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 531-32.
124. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
125. Id. at 488 (1999).
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who belonged to a militant group, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, which the Government characterized as an international
terrorist and communist organization. 26  The aliens claimed that they
were selected for deportation because of their association with the
organization, and that targeting them based on membership in a political
association violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.,27
The Court stated that while selective enforcement is an acceptable
claim in criminal law, an alien cannot assert it as a defense againstd , 128
deportation. Such a defense would require the Attorney General to
advance general domestic policy reasons for the alien's deportation, but
also to disclose "foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-
intelligence products and techniques" in order to defend against a
selective enforcement claim.29  The Court stated that although
deportation "may assuredly be grave," it is necessary "to . ..end an
ongoing violation of United States law," and therefore, it is irrelevant if
the alien was improperly selected.3
C, The Balance Between the First Amendment and Governmental
Interests
1. The First Amendment in Criminal Cases
The First Amendment's bar to Congress's abridgement of the
freedoms of speech and press is not absolute; instead, it must be balanced
with "valid but conflicting governmental interests." 3  In Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,1 2 a case in which the Court held that the
126. Id. at 473.
127. Id. at 474.
128. See id. at 490-91.
129. Id. at 490-91. Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, which recognized that
the executive should not be required to:
[D]isclose its "real" reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a
special threat-or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign
country by focusing on that country's nationals-and even if it did disclose them
a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable
to assess their adequacy.
Id. at 491.
130. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491.
131. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.l (1960) (holding that a
statute prohibiting a Communist sympathizer from becoming a member of the California
Bar did not violate the petitioner's freedom of speech because of the underlying
government interest).
132. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (stating that absent an overriding interest, there is a
presumption that all criminal trials be open). In addition to Chief Justice Burger's
opinion, there were two concurring opinions, three concurrences in judgment, one
dissenting opinion, and one Justice who did not take part. See id. Justice Rehnquist
dissented, on the ground that while the Supreme Court has the authority to review
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public and press have a constitutional right to be present at criminal
trials, the Supreme Court developed a test to balance these competing
interests. 133
In Richmond Newspapers, the defendant, who was on trial for the
fourth time on the same murder indictment, requested that the
proceedings be closed because he was concerned that he would not be
able to receive a fair trial.3 4 A Virginia trial judge agreed, relying on a
state code that allowed judges to close hearings at their discretion.'35
Representatives of Richmond newspapers challenged the order, asserting
that proceedings could not be closed unless there were factual findings
proving there was no other way to protect the defendant.'36 The trial
court disagreed and ordered that the proceeding remain closed.' The
newspaper petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court, which denied its
appeal based on a finding of no reversible error by the lower court.138
The newspaper appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
reversed the prior orders and formulated a test to determine whether the
closing of a criminal trial violated the free speech guarantees of the First
decisions made by the state supreme courts on issues involving the Constitution, in this
instance the Court should have deferred to the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court.
See id at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 580-81. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, stated that "[tioday ... for
the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to
important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment." Id at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134. See id at 559. Defendant was indicted for murdering a hotel manager. Id. After
the defendant was convicted in the first trial, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
trial court improperly admitted a bloodstained shirt into evidence. Id At the retrial, a
juror asked to be excused after jury selection, and no alternate had been appointed. Id
The third trial ended in a mistrial when a juror told the other jurors about newspaper
articles he had read on the defendant and the pending case. Id. The fourth trial was the
one at issue in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. Id. at 559-60. The defendant
asserted concerns that, based on the numerous and drawn-out history of the proceedings
to that point, there could be information leaks and inaccurate reporting by the media. Id
at 560-61. He also claimed that the "smallness" of the community in which the case was
heard could create a risk of juror improprieties. Id.
135. Id. at 560 (citing VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980)). The code relied upon,
provides in part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor
cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the
accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
Id. at 560 n.2.
136. See id at 560.
137. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562. The judge subsequently released the
jury and found the defendant not guilty due to lack of sufficient evidence by the
prosecution. Id. Tapes of the proceedings were distributed to the public as soon as the
trial ended. Id. at 562 n.3.
138. See id. at 562.
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Amendment."' The Supreme Court cited four reasons why criminal
proceedings should remain open despite a valid government interest.1
40
First, the public's right to attend criminal trials can be traced through
history to the beginning of American jurisprudence. Second, the First
Amendment guarantees the right to freedom of speech, press and
assembly.' 2 Third, there is a fundamental right to enjoy these First
Amendment assurances." And Fourth, access to criminal trials offers a
therapeutic remedy to those who have been shocked by horrific crimes.4
Six years after the decision in Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme
Court again addressed the issue of open criminal proceedings in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, this time extending the
right of access to the preliminary hearings of criminal proceedings.' The
Court, drawing upon its analysis in Richmond Newspapers, narrowed the
inquiries to be made in determining whether a criminal proceeding
should be closed: first, courts must determine whether there is a
139. See generally Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
140. Id. at 564-73.
141. Id. at 573-75.
142. Id. at 575-77.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 570-71.
145. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II). In Press-Enterprise II, the issue was
whether there was a First Amendment right to access preliminary hearing transcripts in a
criminal prosecution. Id. at 3. A constitutional presumption exists that most stages of the
criminal process, including preliminary hearings, voir dire selection, and criminal
contempt proceedings, are open to the public and press. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1) (extending the
presumption of openness to voir dire examination and juror selection); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603-11 (1982) (holding that the protection of victims may
justify closing certain stages of criminal proceedings); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
580-81 (stating that unless persuaded otherwise by movant, there is a presumption that all
criminal trials be open); Levine v. United States; 362 U.S.. 610, 616 (1960) (holding that
criminal contempt proceedings must be open); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 842
(3d Cir. 1994) (upholding a ruling that a post-trial examination of juror for potential
misconduct be open); United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding a
presumption of openness to transcripts of sidebars or chambers conferences concerning
evidentiary rulings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d' 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982)
(acknowledging that pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings require
due process protections).
Various federal courts have extended the First Amendment right outside of the
criminal arena. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177,
181 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the Richmond Newspapers test to grant a right of access to
municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 960 F.2d 105, 110 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding a First Amendment right to an administrative voter list); Publicker Indus.,
Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984) (extending; the Richmond Newspapers
analysis to civil trials); Soc'y of Prof'1 Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574-
75 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that the Richmond Newspapers test requires administrative
hearings to be open).
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tradition of presumptive openness (the "experience" prong); and second,
courts must determine whether the judicial process will benefit from an
open proceeding (the "logic" prong).146  The Court asserted that
whenever openness will have a positive effect on the judicial process, it
shall act accordingly to ensure access to procedures. 4 1 In recognizing the
preliminary hearing as an integral part of the trial process, the Court held
that the presence of the press would assure that the hearing would be
conducted in a just manner."'
2. The First Amendment and Right of the Press to Access Information
The Supreme Court has held that there is no unfettered right to access
government-controlled national security information. 4 9  The right to
access information is limited by the nature of the information and any
146. Press-Enterprise 1 478 U.S. at 8-9. The court in North Jersey Media Group
referred to the Richmond Newspaper analysis as the "Richmond Newspaper Standard,"
consisting of the "history of openness" prong and the "logic" prong. North Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300-01 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002).
147. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13. The Court held that in order for the
criminal prosecution process to function properly, a neutral observer must be present in
the courtroom. Id. at 12-13. The Court stated that "[t]he absence of a jury, long
recognized as 'an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,' makes the importance of public access to
a preliminary hearing even more significant." Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968)). Also, the court found that the label of the proceeding should not be
determinative of the access granted. Id at [2 ("California preliminary hearings are
sufficiently like a trial to justify [that public access is essential to the proper functioning of
the criminal justice system.]").
148. See id at 12-13. Conversely, the dissenters recognized the defendant's concern
that pre-trial publicity may jeopardize his right to a fair trial. Id. at 20 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Instead of ensuring a fair trial by allowing the press to be present, the
dissenters asserted that the majority view may reach an opposite result. See id. at 29
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (stating that the right to speak and
publish does not create an unrestrained right to gather information); see also Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (holding that there is not a First Amendment right to
access prisons). In Houchins, the Supreme Court determined that the press has no right to
access government information unless the political branches decide to grant such a right.
Id. There, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' arguments that they should be
granted full access to view a county jail. Id. at 3. The Court refused to grant petitioners'
relief based on the First Amendment because their claims "invite[] the Court to involve
itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the political
processes." Id. at 12. The Court noted that while public discussion as to efficient prison
management could generate significant debate, the press was not necessarily the best
conduit for debate due to the risk of selective publication of information. Id at 13-14.
Instead, the Court reasoned, the task of generating debates should be left to Congress, the
neutral participant. Id. at 14-16.
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countervailing security interests. Although there is "freedom of the
media to communicate information once it is obtained," there is no
evidence that "the Constitution compels the government to provide the
media with information or access to it on demand."' 5 '
The Supreme Court has shown concern for the ability of government
to conduct business under the restrictions of the First Amendment. In
Zemel v. Rusk, the petitioner claimed that the United States
government's ban on travel to Cuba interfered with his First Amendment
right to assess first-hand the effects of the United States's foreign and
domestic policies on Cuba. 5 2 The Supreme Court held that there was no
First Amendment right to travel abroad in order to evaluate the
government's activities.' Instead, it placed executive decisions above
First Amendment access to information claims when the safety of the
country was at stake.54
III. THE JUDICIARY SHOULD GIVE INCREASED DEFERENCE TO THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN MATIERS OF IMMIGRATION
The Supreme Court, in its interpretation of federal immigration law,
has always defined a limited and relatively deferential role for the federal
judiciary.'55 However, of all the court opinions from Detroit Free Press
and North Jersey Media Group, the only court to exhibit such deference
was the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.' District courts in New Jersey
150. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9.
152. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16.
153. Id. at 16-17. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren expressed this concern:
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of
unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities
to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the
country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First
Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy-
Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of
Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 690 (1984) (discussing the
Freedom of Information Act's recognition of the importance of discretion when dealing
with information in a national security context, in that it exempts information that is
"secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy") (citing 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1)(A) (1982)).
154. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16-17.
155. See discussion supra Part II.
156. See North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); see also
supra Part I.C.2. for a discussion of the opinions comprising the procedural history of
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group.
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and Michigan, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, showed very little
deference, if any, to the government's national security concerns."'
A. A Suggested Deferential Standard of Review for Issues of National
Security
In both Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media, the government
urged the courts to use the "facially legitimate and bona fide standard"
first espoused by the Supreme Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel.5 8 In
Kleindienst, the government denied the issuance of a visa to a known
revolutionary Marxist who was invited to the United States by members
of academia to participate in conferences at various universities.'59 The
plaintiffs consisted of Mr. Mandel, the speaker, and a number of
American citizens who claimed violations of their First Amendment
rights to hear Mr. Mandel's views and engage him in discussion.' 6° The
Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General's prerogative to exclude an
alien, as long as the reason was "facially legitimate and bona fide..'.'. In
other words, an alien's exclusion falls within the broad discretion of the
executive branch; denial of a waiver from such exclusion should not be
examined as long as the Attorney General's reasoning is made in good
faith, and is based on the surrounding circumstances.1
6
1
The judiciary should continue to employ this standard for issues
involving immigration and the First Amendment. There could hardly be
an issue more facially legitimate and bona fide than protecting the
United States against terrorists. Kleindienst and the media cases at bar
all involve United States's citizens arguing that the executive has
disregarded their First Amendment rights based on the executive's
treatment of a third-party alien. 63
157. See discussion supra Part I.C.
158. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,770 (1972). The court in North Jersey Media
Group specifically declined to follow the Kleindeinst deference test. North Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002). The court stated that the Creppy closure was issued to "serve other law
enforcement objectives," implying that was not the case in Kleindeinst. See id. That was
exactly the case in Kleindeinst, in which Mandel was excluded from entry, based among
other things, on his strong advocacy of "economic, governmental, and international
doctrines of world communism." See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 754-60.
159. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 756-57.
160. Id at 759-60.
161. Id. at 769.
162. Id
163. See id. at 754; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2002);
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2002).
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The fact that Kleindienst is an exclusion case rather than a deportation
case should not be dispositive. As evidenced by Harisiades and
Galvan, the Court will defer to the Attorney General, even in• 165
deportation cases, if the government's interest is national security. In
addition, Kleindienst was decided almost twenty years after Hariasides
and Galvan, and specifically cited to the precedent of Galvan when
166declining to overturn that line of cases. The Court's reference to
Hariasides and Galvan implies that in deciding Kleindienst, the Court
considered those decisions to be good law and that the current Supreme
Court would have to overturn precedent to apply a standard other than
the "facially legitimate and bona fide standard" set forth in
Kleindienst.
167
B. Agencies Are Required To Create Regulations in Furtherance of
Their Responsibilities
Deference also should be given to the executive branch because each
department head is charged with creating regulations for his
department. 161 Courts have historically recognized this responsibility by
leaving the formulation of procedures to the discretion of the individual
agencies."' Courts give deference because administrators are more
familiar with their agency's responsibilities and therefore have more
expertise in their respective fields than the federal courts. Agencies can
develop procedural rules which are a better fit for the peculiarities of the
individual industries and the responsibilities of the agencies involved.""
164. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. (articulating the difference between an exclusion
case and a deportation case).
165. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
166. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766-67 (citing Justice Frankfurter's acknowledgement
that judicial precedent does not allow the Court to decide adversely to congressional
enactments).
167. See id. at 762, 766-67.
168. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
169. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (holding that nothing in the applicable statutes or in the
circumstances surrounding the case warranted the Court of Appeals to overturn
procedures established by the Atomic Energy Commission). Administrative rulemaking
was first permitted in 1813 when the Supreme Court authorized Congress to delegate
certain legislative powers to the executive branch. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 91, at
99.
170. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965).
[A]n outgrowth of the congressional determination that administrative agencies
and administrators will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and
will be in a better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design
procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the
agency involved.
1009
Catholic University Law Review
INS regulations currently allow judges to hold closed meetings.7 In
recognizing the key role that the INS plays in the war against terrorism,
the Creppy Memo simply extended the existing regulation to account for
tasks of the agency where the improper disclosure of information could
threaten national security.1
In Zadvydas v. Davis,"' Justice Breyer, in dicta, suggested that
deference might be required when the INS promulgates regulations
against the backdrop of national security concerns.' 4 Zadvydas, decided
by the Supreme Court in 2001, involved the question of whether
"dangerousness" alone justified detaining aliens for indefinite amounts
of time in instances where deportation was ordered, but not possibleY.'
Justice Breyer's opinion focused on the due process rights of the resident
immigrants."' According to the Court, because the aliens had entered
and lived as permanent residents, they should be afforded procedural• , 177
due process rights. The Court held that even though the aliens were
dangerous criminals and deportation orders had been issued, they could
not be arbitrarily detained while awaiting deportation."'
171. See INS Immigration Court Rules of Procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(b) (2002)
(excepting from the presumption of openness, "[fior the purpose of protecting witnesses,
parties, or the public interest, the Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a
closed hearing."); INS Removal Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 240.t0(b) (2002) (stating that
"[r]emoval hearings shall be open to the public, except that the immigration judge may, in
his or her discretion, close proceedings as provided in § 3.27 of this chapter.").
172. See Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 25.
173. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
174. Id. at 690-91, 696. The Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press cited the Zadvydas
Court's statement that its decision might be different if the case had involved terrorism.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2002). The court rejected the
notion, however, that the statements in Zadvydas could be applied in current cases, stating
that the procedural protections required that closure determinations in deportation
hearings should be made on a case-by-case basis. Id at 692-93.
175. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. Alien Zadvydas had a long criminal record that
included various drug crimes, attempted robbery, attempted burglary, and theft. Id at
684. He was determined to be a flight risk. Id. The alien in a companion case, Kim Ho
Ma, was involved in a gang shooting and was convicted of manslaughter. Id. at 685. See
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power. The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002) (discussing the Zadvydas opinion
and the possible legal and political ramifications of the Court's holding).
176. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
177. Id. at 693-94 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)). The
Court distinguished the situation of an alien-citizen from one who is stopped at the border,
holding that those who do not enter the country are not afforded any constitutional rights.
See id. at 693. Hence, congressional plenary power remains intact for those situations.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 175, at 368-69.
178. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (construing the statute to have an implicit reasonable
time limitation). Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents in a German displaced persons
camp and moved to the United States when he was eight years old. See id at 684.
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The statute under review involved post-removal detention that allowed
the Government to detain an alien beyond the allowed ninety-day
period. 9 The aliens based their claim, not on the Attorney General's
discretion, but on the procedural issue, i.e., the authority of the Attorney
General to exercise discretion under the statute. '  The Court in
Zadvydas held that the Attorney General does not have the authority to
indefinitely detain an alien if removal will not be effected in the
reasonably foreseeable future. 18' Despite that holding, the Court
specifically noted that no consideration was given to "terrorism or other
special circumstances" that accord "heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security." '82 This language suggests that the current Court may also be
willing to afford more deference to the Government's procedural
decisions when national security is at issue."'
IV. CLOSING DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE CREPPY
MEMO DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. No Clear Presumption Exists That Immigration Hearings Are Open
Proceedings
The first requirement of the Richmond Newspaper analysis - the
"experience" prong - cannot be met in the case of closed deportation
hearings because there is no clear presumption that immigration hearings
are open.184 As the Third Circuit stated in North Jersey Media Group,
"the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent
Zadvydas was being held indefinitely because no country would accept him, each claiming
he was not a citizen of that nation. Id. His renewed application to become a Lithuanian
citizen was pending at the time of the trial. Id. Ma was born in Cambodia where he
stayed until he was two years old, at which time he and his parents fled to several
countries, ending up in the United States at the age of seven. See id. at 685. Ma filed a
writ of habeas corpus at the end of the statutory ninety-day detention period, and was
released on the basis that Cambodia had no repatriation agreement with the United
States. Id. at 686.
179. Id. at 682-83; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(2),(c)
(2000).
180. See Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 688.
181. Id. at 701-02. A reasonably foreseeable future requires that there be a
"significant likelihood" of removal within a presumptive time period of six months. Id. at
701.
182. Id at 696. See also supra note 174 and accompanying text.
183. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06
(1993) (showing deference to the executive branch's procedural decision not to release
juvenile aliens except to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians).
184. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002).
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to support a First Amendment right of access. ''185 Richmond Newspapers
requires an unbroken and uncontradicted history of openness."8 6 This
history does not exist in the context of immigration hearings.'7
While there is a practice of open deportation hearings, it is a practice
subject to a wide variety of exceptions. Regulations require that
hearings be closed in cases that involve an abused alien spouse or an
abused alien child.'89 An alien spouse can request the proceeding to be
open, but a child cannot.'9° The proceeding can also be closed in the
interest of "protecting witnesses, parties, or the public interest."' 9' This
INS regulation is that which Chief Immigration Judge Creppy relied
upon when issuing his memo.192 Additionally, current practice includes
deportation hearings that are conducted in places from which the public
is banned, including prisons and hospitals.' 93 And deportation hearings
that involve asylum claims are required to be closed unless the alien
requests otherwise.194 As demonstrated, sufficient examples of regularly
closed deportation hearings exist to support a finding that there is no
unspoken history of open proceedings.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 212 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73).
187. Id. at 213.
188. In applying 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(b) (2002), which allows for closure of immigration
hearings to protect "witnesses, parties, or the public interest," immigration judges have
not used a strict scrutiny analysis. See Government's Application for a Stay Pending
Appeal, supra note 26, at 18. Instead, immigration judges frequently close immigration
hearings when an alien so desires. Id.
189. INS Immigration Court Rules of Procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(c) (2002). This
regulation states:
In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge concerning an abused spouse,
the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall be closed to the public unless the
abused alien spouse agrees that the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall
be open to the public. In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge
concerning an abused alien child, the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall
be closed to the public.
Id.
190. Id.
191. 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(b) (2002).
192. See Government's Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 26, at 6.
193. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 104-269, pt. I, at 124 (1996)).
194. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2)(iii) (providing for closure of hearings in asylum cases
involving aliens who face a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if they return to their
home country).
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B. The Experience Prong of Richmond Newspapers Should Focus Not
Only on the Positive Aspects of Open Proceedings, But On the Harm
That the Public Will Endure
The Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group emphasized the need
to look at the positive attributes of an open proceeding, and the ways in
which openness will "impair[] the public good."' 95 In this context, the
Richmond Newspapers analysis demonstrates that there will always be a
finding of public good because openness will always promote citizen
debate)96 However, merely facilitating discussion is hardly a virtue that
cannot be overcome by serious national public interest issues. 97
As history reveals, the judiciary has been deferential to the executive
branch in matters concerning national security.'" This deference should
extend to the balancing of the logic prong of the Richmond Newspapers
test. The Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group followed such a
deferential approach by stating:
The assessments before us have been made by senior
government officials responsible for investigating the events of
September 11th and for preventing future attacks. These
officials believe that closure of special interest hearings is
necessary to advance these goals, and their concerns, as
expressed in the Watson Declaration, have gone unrebutted.
To the extent that the Attorney General's national security
concerns seem credible, we will not lightly second-guess them"
99
The reason for withholding information, as expressed by the Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dale Watson, is that the investigation
consists of many different pieces that, when placed together, create a• 200
mosaic. Mr. Watson expressed his concern with the judiciary's
195. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.
196. Id. ("[W]ere the logic prong only to determine whether openness serves some
good, it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not
have a First Amendment right of access.").
197. See id.
198. See discussion supra Part II.
199. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219 (footnote omitted).
200. Id.; see also Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67
Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 28, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3) (declaring that the
measures are necessary "[d]ue to the mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering, for
example, [w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed may appear of great moment to one
who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in
context" (quoting McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); North Jersey
Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the government's interests include: avoidance of setbacks to
its terrorism investigation and prevention of harm to detainees if their identities become
public); see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (citing other intelligence gathering
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proposed case-by-case analysis, stating that its "lack of experience
regarding national security" and its "inability to see the mosaic" may
cause it to make incorrect and severely detrimental determinations when
considering isolated facts. 1
The Supreme Court has recognized the potential danger that may
ensue if the judiciary forces officers of the executive branch to disclose
2112classified information. Justice Scalia noted in AAADCthat if the INS
has to provide the real reason for deporting each alien it deems to be a
special threat, it could reveal detrimental foreign intelligence information
or objectives. It appears Justice Scalia did not believe the judiciary
possesses the requisite information to make a full and informed decision
when national security is at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
While the executive branch should not have the right to function
unchecked by other branches of government, sufficient history and
precedent supports the proposition that some leeway is appropriate when
regulating in the interest of national security. The federal judiciary
should follow this precedent by allowing the INS to properly and
completely conduct its duties when processing aliens, and assisting other
governmental investigative agencies in tracking down aliens who may
pose a threat to the United States. It is the executive branch, through the
FBI, CIA, and INS, that holds the necessary information to subvert
another attack - not Congress, or the Judiciary. This proposed deference
may help avoid a replay of September 11, 2001.
cases); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (observing that "intelligence
gathering.., is more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a
cloak and dagger affair").
201. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219. Another ramification of a case-by-
case determination is that the immigration system could become inundated with cases if
the press and/or the public challenged each determination by an immigration judge to
close a proceeding, which would cause great delays in the investigation on terrorism. See
Government's Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 26, at 32-33.
202. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AAADC), 525 U.S.
471, 490-91 (1999); see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.
203. AAADC,525 U.S. at 490-91.
204. See id. at 489-90.
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